India–Central Asia: From Strategic Outreach to Eurasian Leverage


Context

  1. Strategic Moment: Indian Prime Minister’s 29 August–1 September 2026 visit to Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, including participation in the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, places India–Central Asia relations within the wider framework of India’s Eurasian engagement. 
  2. The visit also provides an opportunity to consolidate India’s bilateral partnerships while deepening its engagement with the region’s principal multilateral platform.
  3. From Connectivity to Strategic Convergence: Following the 4th India–Central Asia Dialogue (2025), the visit gains significance as the Central Asian republics increasingly exercise strategic autonomy through diversified external partnerships. 
  4. Their energy resources, critical minerals and strategic location along Eurasian connectivity corridors further enhance the region’s importance to India’s long-term economic and strategic interests.

How Is India Expanding Its Strategic and Economic Footprint in Central Asia?

  1. Strategic Partnership Beyond Geopolitics: India’s regional approach evolved from the Connect Central Asia Policy (2012) to the India–Central Asia Dialogue (2019) and the first India–Central Asia Summit (2022), giving political engagement a structured regional framework. 
  2. The relationship has consequently broadened from bilateral outreach to sustained institutionalised cooperation involving political, economic, security and developmental dimensions.
  3. Security cooperation covers counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, intelligence coordination and defence training, with exercises including KAZIND, DUSTLIK and KHANJAR strengthening operational familiarity. 
  4. India also engages the Central Asian republics through the SCO and CICA, while all five have supported India’s aspiration for permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council.
  5. Energy And Resource Security: Kazakhstan supplied India 3,000 MT of uranium ore concentrate during 2010–14 and 5,000 MT during 2015–19, followed by a further supply agreement for 4,557.67 tU during 2020–22. 
  6. Uzbekistan has also contracted to supply 1,100 MT of natural uranium ore concentrate during 2022–26, strengthening the resource base of India’s civilian nuclear-energy programme.
  7. Central Asia’s resource endowment includes uranium, oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower and rare-earth elements, with Kazakhstan possessing 15 of the 17 known rare-earth elements identified in the supplied research. 
  8. Cooperation is therefore extending towards rare-earth exploration, geological expertise, sustainable extraction and supply-chain diversification, particularly relevant to India’s clean-energy and high-technology manufacturing requirements.
  9. Connectivity And Trade Corridors: The INSTC and Ashgabat Agreement constitute important components of India’s effort to establish reliable access to the landlocked Central Asian markets through alternative Eurasian routes. 
  10. The Eastern Route has gained practical relevance, with a container train from India covering 2,673 km to Uzbekistan in 20 days, with the transit time targeted at 15 days.
  11. India–Central Asia connectivity increasingly encompasses the less visible infrastructure of commerce, including customs procedures, TIR Carnet, banking links and settlement in national currencies. 
  12. These dimensions are important because efficient physical corridors require corresponding financial and procedural connectivity to support regular commercial flows.
  13. Trade And Investment Diversification: India–Central Asia merchandise trade increased from about US$490 million in 2010 to US$1.72 billion in 2023, with Indian exports led by pharmaceutical products, while mineral fuels and related resource commodities constitute important Central Asian exports to India. 
  14. The trade relationship therefore combines India’s value-added manufacturing strengths with Central Asia’s resource base, although its overall scale remains modest.
  15. Indian investment in Central Asia has been estimated at about US$1.5 billion, with a substantial concentration in the coal, oil and gas sectors. 
  16. The wider investment potential extends to logistics, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, engineering, food processing and transport, creating scope for greater private-sector participation and technological cooperation.
  17. Development And Knowledge Partnership: India’s engagement increasingly encompasses IT, communications, English-language training, education and professional capacity building, alongside growing student and medical-education linkages. 
  18. More than 10,000 Indian students, predominantly pursuing medical education, were reported to be studying in Central Asian universities, indicating the expanding human-capital dimension of the relationship.
  19. Digital And Developmental Cooperation: India’s experience with Digital Public Infrastructure, including Aadhaar, UPI and CoWIN, provides a knowledge-based dimension to its engagement with Central Asian partners. 
  20. Cooperation is also expanding into healthcare, scientific collaboration, tourism and development knowledge, complementing traditional resource and security linkages with a broader development partnership.

What Prevents India from Converting Strategic Goodwill into Regional Economic Weight?

  1. Geography-Driven Friction: India has no direct land access to Central Asia, while Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit blocks the shortest terrestrial route. 
  2. Consequently, Indian shipments depend on longer multimodal routes, increasing freight costs, transit time and logistical uncertainty. 
  3. This structural disadvantage reduces the price competitiveness of Indian products against suppliers with direct continental access.
  4. Corridor Vulnerability: India’s access through Iran remains exposed to sanctions, geopolitical volatility, insurance constraints and payment-related risks, making long-term commercial planning difficult. 
  5. Uncertainty surrounding the sanctions environment and transit arrangements has added to risks in the Chabahar route. 
  6. Similarly, TAPI (Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) remains constrained by Afghanistan’s security situation and strained India–Pakistan relations.
  7. Low Trade Intensity: India–Central Asia merchandise trade remains modest, reaching about US$1.72 billion in 2023, despite the region’s considerable resource base and proximity to major Eurasian markets. 
  8. Even the higher estimate of around US$2.5 billion for 2025 remains small relative to China–Central Asia trade, which crossed US$100 billion in 2025. 
  9. This trade-scale asymmetry reflects the persistent gap between diplomatic engagement and commercial penetration.
  10. Private-Sector Hesitancy: Indian private-sector engagement remains concentrated in pharmaceuticals and IT, with limited investment in energy, logistics and infrastructure.
  11. High transport costs, market-information gaps and regulatory uncertainties discourage wider commercial participation.
  12. Consequently, strategic goodwill has yet to generate a broad and self-sustaining business constituency.
  13. Structural Competitive Asymmetry: China combines geographical proximity, infrastructure finance, pipelines, railways, industrial investment and established trade networks, giving it an ecosystem-level advantage in Central Asia. 
  14. Russia retains complementary advantages through language, migration, military interoperability, energy linkages and longstanding political networks. 
  15. India therefore confronts not merely stronger competitors, but deeply embedded regional economic and institutional relationships that are difficult to displace.
  16. Regional Heterogeneity: The five republics differ substantially in their economic structures, resource endowments, regulatory environments and development priorities, limiting the effectiveness of a uniform regional approach. 
  17. Their external partnerships are also increasingly diversified across Russia, China, Türkiye, the European Union, the United States and Gulf countries. 
  18. This multiplicity makes Central Asia a complex, competitive market in which Indian interests must navigate distinct national conditions rather than a single regional economic system.
  19. Institutional Capacity Gap: Persistent bureaucratic inertia and inadequate institutional capacity constrain the continuity and execution of India’s engagement across a geographically dispersed region. 
  20. The absence of a sufficiently integrated Eurasian strategy further weakens policy coherence between India’s Central Asian priorities and its wider continental interests. 
  21. The resulting implementation deficit can prevent individual diplomatic commitments from acquiring sustained economic and strategic traction.
  22. Afghanistan–Water Nexus: Afghanistan continues to present a combined security, economic and regional-stability challenge, with terrorism and economic fragility retaining implications for neighbouring Central Asian states. 
  23. The Qosh Tepa Canal adds a transboundary water dimension because altered Amu Darya flows could affect agricultural and water security in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
  24. The convergence of security uncertainty and water governance therefore complicates the broader regional environment in which India seeks deeper engagement.


How Can India Turn Central Asian Engagement into Sustainable Geo-Economic Gains?

  1. Make Connectivity Commercially Viable: India should assess Eurasian routes through landed cost, transit reliability, insurance exposure and border efficiency, rather than physical distance alone. 
  2. A corridor-performance framework could identify commercially viable routes and match cargo to corridors according to value-to-weight ratios, improving the economic sustainability of India–Central Asia trade.
  3. Build Regional Value Chains: India should move beyond predominantly resource-based transactions towards joint value creation in pharmaceuticals, agro-processing, engineering, textiles and critical-mineral processing. 
  4. Country-specific industrial partnerships could combine Central Asian resource advantages with Indian technology, managerial capabilities and market demand, creating production linkages rather than predominantly bilateral commodity exchanges.
  5. Create Mineral-To-Manufacturing Linkages: Critical-mineral cooperation should extend beyond access to raw materials towards geological mapping, beneficiation, processing technology and downstream manufacturing. 
  6. Long-term offtake arrangements, supported by transparent sustainability standards, could improve supply predictability while enabling Central Asian producers to capture greater value from their mineral resources.
  7. Reduce Transaction Costs: India should pursue a comprehensive trade-cost reduction architecture covering customs documentation, certification, standards, cargo insurance and cross-border payments. 
  8. Interoperable documentation and predictable regulatory procedures could reduce the non-physical barriers to trade, making existing transport routes more commercially competitive without depending solely on new physical infrastructure.
  9. Mobilise Private Capital: A dedicated project-preparation facility could convert commercially promising proposals into bankable projects by supporting feasibility studies, legal due diligence, market assessment and risk evaluation. 
  10. Such a mechanism would particularly assist smaller Indian firms that lack the financial and informational capacity to independently evaluate unfamiliar Central Asian markets.
  11. Expand Knowledge-Based Exports: India should deepen cross-border markets for healthcare, higher education, IT services, engineering consultancy and professional skills, where distance is less restrictive than for bulk merchandise. 
  12. Joint research, academic collaboration and mutually recognised professional qualifications could create durable human-capital linkages and strengthen India's position in knowledge-intensive sectors.
  13. Adopt Measurable Regional Benchmarks: India should develop a Central Asia Economic Outcomes Framework with measurable indicators covering trade diversification, private investment, transit time, logistics costs and value-chain participation. 
  14. Outcome-based evaluation would shift attention from the number of agreements concluded towards commercial depth, implementation quality and measurable economic returns, enabling periodic recalibration of India's regional economic strategy.


Concluding Insight

India’s Central Asia strategy now requires a shift from strategic intent to economic traction. By combining corridor viability, value-chain integration, knowledge partnerships and outcome-based delivery, New Delhi can convert geographic constraints into strategic relevance. The objective should be neither dominance nor imitation, but a credible, complementary and commercially sustainable Eurasian partnership.


UPSC Prelims Connect

Q. Consider the following countries: (2022)

  1. Azerbaijan   
  2. Kyrgyzstan   
  3. Tajikistan   
  4. Turkmenistan   
  5. Uzbekistan   

Which of the above have borders with Afghanistan?   

(a) 1, 2 and 5 only   

(b) 1, 2, 3 and 4 only   

(c) 3, 4 and 5 only    

(d) 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 

Ans: (c)


UPSC Mains Connect

Q. Critically analyse India’s evolving diplomatic, economic, & strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs), highlighting their increasing significance in regional & global geopolitics. (2024)

Q. A number of outside powers have entrenched themselves in Central Asia, which is a zone of interest to India. Discuss the implications, in this context, of India’s joining the Ashgabat Agreement, 2018. (2018)


QuestlinkIAS Practice Question

Prelims:

Q. With reference to India’s engagement with Central Asia, consider the following statements:

  1. India announced the Connect Central Asia Policy before becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
  2. The Ashgabat Agreement and the International North–South Transport Corridor provide alternative connectivity frameworks for India’s access to Central Asia.
  3. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan constitute important partners for India in uranium cooperation, while Kazakhstan also possesses significant rare-earth resources.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

(a) 1 and 2 only

(b) 2 and 3 only

(c) 1 and 3 only

(d) 1, 2 and 3

Answer: (d) 

Mains:

Q. India’s engagement with Central Asia has acquired institutional depth, but its economic outcomes remain disproportionately modest. Critically examine the structural factors responsible for this divergence and assess the implications for India’s evolving Eurasian strategy.


Source Editorial- India’s return to its Central Asian neighbourhood - The Hindu